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IMPERATIVE VALUES OF A LOGICAL FORGIVENESS

Abhayraj Naik*
This article deals with the nuances of the concept of forgiveness' and
its role in shaping law and societal institutions. In the background of
Aurel Kolnai1 notions on the act of forgiveness, the author analyses
the different conceptualiZations of forgiveness. The logical paradox of
forgiveness as formulated by Kolnai is considered. The article argues
that the notion of 'divineforgiveness' is not vulnerable to thisparadox.
Hence there is a needfor interpersonalforgivenessto adopt some of the
premises on which divine forgiveness is based on. The critical interrelations between the concepts of forgiveness, patience and trust and
their role in approximating interpersonalforgiveness with divine

forgiveness are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
I.

.............................................

Contextualizing Kolnai's Paradox

.....................

101
...... 104

II. Divine Forgiveness, Kantian Grace and Kolnai's Paradox..............111
III. Trust, Patience and Forgiveness

............................

117

INTRODUCTION
Philosophers have long struggled with providing a coherent account of
the idea of forgiveness. From the ancient Greeks through the Hebrew and
Assistant Professor and Assistant Director for the Centre for Public Law &
Jurisprudence, Jindal Global Law School, Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana.

I am indebted to Professor Jules Coleman and Professor Anthony Kronman for
promoting my nascent research interest in this area. I thank my student Neelam
Singh for excellent research assistance and for reviewing an earlier draft. I am highly
indebted to a number of family, friends and colleagues, far too many to mention
here, who were willing to seriously discuss forgiveness with me. Acknowledgments
are also due to the editors and an anonymous reviewer of the Socio-Legal Review for
comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. All errors that have inadvertently
crept in remain fully my own responsibility.
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Christian Bibles to the present day, forgiveness has typically been regarded as a
personal response to having been injured or wronged, or as a condition one
seeks or hopes is bestowed upon one for having wronged someone else.' While
forgiveness as a concept does not easily lend itself to rational cognition or easy
logical elaboration, the assertion that forgiveness as a phenomenon entails the
foregoing of resentment has gained much academic and historical credence.
Dostoevsky's celebrated novel The Brothers KaramaZov beautifully illustrates the
difficulty in ascribing a proper place to forgiveness in our lives. Ivan Karamazov
(in accordance with his principles of autonomy and freedom) considers
forgiveness as a moral outrage, in itself a violation of the moral law. His brother
Alyosha, on the other hand, recognizes and accepts the possibility of a divine
and miraculous forgiveness as a response to guilt. This fundamental disagreement
between the brothers is instructive for it directs us to an under-explored
intellectual terrain generated by the persistent question of whether forgiveness
is possible or impossible. A convincing response to this question is a necessary
precursor to any commitment to forgiveness as a virtue or a duty in our personal
lives and in the ordering of our law and societal institutions.
I will be here considering in detail a seminal paper titled Forgivenessby the
Hungarian philosopher Aurel Kolnai (published in the ProceedingsoftheAristotelian
Society 1973-74). Kolnai discusses the central question of whether, and if so in
what manner, forgiveness is possible at all. After distinguishing the concept of
forgiveness from non-imputation, indifference, exculpation, excusing, emotional

Paul M. Hughes, Forgiveness, SLANFoRD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, (2010), http:/
2

/plato. stanford.edu/entries /forgiveness/.
Bishop Butler's sermon on resentment is a classic example. See BISHOP JOSEPH BUTLER,
SERMONS (Hilliard and Brown 1827) (2005) [hereinafter Butler]. In his eighth Sermon,
Butler describes resentment as a "weapon put into our hands by nature, against injury,
injustice, and cuelty" See Butler, at 116.
See Aurel Kolnai, Forgiveness, 74 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 91, 91106 (1973-4). [hereinafter Kolnai]. This paper was published a few months after
Kolnai's death in 1973. On Kolnai's characterization of his own mode of enquiry on
a primarily ethical subject, he states: "In fact, I intend it to be chiefy logical in nature: the
centralquestion I wish to discuss is not how far and in what sense forgiveness is commendable or
perhaps objectionable, but whether, and if so in what manner, it is logically possible at all" See
Kolnai, at 91.
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prescription, revised insight and revised judgment, Kolnai elaborates the logical
paradox of forgiveness as:
"Either the wrong is stillflourishing, the offence still subsisting: then by
'forgiving"you accept it and thus confirm it and make it worse; or the
wrongdoer has suitably annulled and eliminated his offence, and then by
harping on itfurtheryou would set up a new evil and by 'forgiving"you
would only acknowledge thefact thatyou are no longer its victim. Briefly,
forgiveness is either unjustified or pointless."
The resolution of whether forgiveness is justified or pointless is of great
relevance to socio-legal studies, and Kolnai's paradox represents an instructive
trope for analysis. Legal treatment of crime and punishment rests on an often
unarticulated understanding on the relationship between forgiveness and
punishment.' Derrida, makes the argument that forgiveness forgives only the
unforgivable (in contrast to Hegel who argued that all is forgivable except the
crime against spirit, that is, against the reconciling power of forgiveness).6 An
answer to what is forgivable forms the core of the legality of reconciliation and
amnesty arrangements, the treatment of crimes by juvenile offenders, justification
of action and statutory exceptions to culpability, plea-bargaining and
compounding of criminal offences, considerations in sentencing of criminals

4

Id. at 98-99.

5

Hannah Arendt's views are worth citing in brief here: "The alternative to forgiveness, but

by no means its opposite, is punishment, and both have in common that they attempt to put an end
to something that without interference could go on endlessly. It is therefore quite significant, a
structuralelement in the realm of human affairs, that men are unable to forgive what thy cannot
punish and that thy are unable to punish what has turned out to be unforgivable. This is the true
hallmark of those offenses which, since Kant, we call "radicalevil" and about whose nature so little
is known, even to us who have been exposed to one of their rare outbursts on the public scene. All
we know is that we can neitherpunish norforgive such offenses and that they therefore transcendthe

realm of human affairs and the potentialities of human power, both of which they radically

6

destroy wherever thy make their appearance. Here, where the deed itself dispossesses us of all
power, we can indeed only repeat with Jesus: '"[t were betterfor him that a millstone were hanged
about his neck, and he cast into the sea." See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HuMAN CONDITION
241 (University of Chicago Press 1998) (1958) [hereinafter ARENDT].
See JACQUES DERRIDA, ON COSMOPOLITANISM AND FORGIVENESS (Mark Dooley and
Michael Hughes trans., Routledge 2d ed. 2001) (1997). [hereinafter DERRIDA].
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and forms of pardon and clemency, etc. When the operation of the law results
in the death of the criminal due to an unforgivable crime, the violent implications
of Kolnai's paradox come fully to the fore.' Criminals who are punished with
death (and denied pardons, mercy petitions and similar reprieves) have marked
on their bodies the legal and political declaration of "unforgivableity". A
judgment that the specific acts by the specific person ought not to be forgiven
can be rational only if it also successfully anticipates and accounts for whether
the specific acts by the specific person could be forgiven.' The logical possibility
of forgiveness is a sine qua non for, the consideration of whether forgiveness is a
moral or legal duty for citizens, judges and nation-states.' A re-appreciation of
Kolnai's paradox of forgiveness - and an articulation of the manner in which it
may be resolved - contributes to identifying and characterizing the imperative
operative values in any choice, judgment or characterization involving
forgiveness, and more generally, punishment. In the following parts of this paper,
I briefly elaborate and contextualize Kolnai's paradox, and then offer sketches
of an argument (using the Kantian idea of grace) for how an analysis of divine
forgiveness suggests that promoting the values of patience and trust facilitates
the realization of a logical interpersonal forgiveness.

Contextualizing Kolnai's Paradox
The logical paradox of forgiveness as fully formulated by Kolnai finds
reference and contextualization in much of the scholarly literature devoted to
7

8

9

See generaly, Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE

LAW JOURNAL1601

(1986).
The prevailing standard in Indian criminal jurisprudence confronts this question in
the form of the rule that the death penalty is permissible only in the "rarest of the rare
cases when the other option is unquestionablyforeclosed" The Indian Supreme Court further
states that "[a] real and abiding concern for the digniy of human ife postulates resistance to
taking a kfe through laws instrumentality." See Bacchan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1982) 3
SCC 24 (Ind.), at paragraph 224.
Derrida makes an analogous argument that all decisions and responsibilities relating
to forgiveness must be made between the two irreconcilable but indissociable poles
of unconditional forgiveness (exemplified by forgiveness given by God, or by divine
prescription) and conditional forgiveness (the order of conditions, repentance,
transformation, etc. that allow forgiveness to inscribe itself in history, law, politics,
existence itself). Derrida, supra note 6, at 44.
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forgiveness.o It is useful to briefly highlight here how the accounts of Jean

Hampton, Gideon Rosen and Pamela Hieronymi have framed Kolnai's paradox
and attempted to respond to it.
The relevance of Kolnai's paradox to the requirements of any universally
valid law is particularly well illustrated by Jean Hampton's question: 'How can
you absolve someone from guilt and still remain committed to the idea that his actions were
wrong and unacceptable?"' Hampton opens her analysis of forgiveness in
'Forgiveness, resentment and hatred' by stating (but not explicitly denying or
acquiescing with) Jeffrie Murphy's provocative thesis that forgiveness 'at times
is not a duty'. 2 While this broad thesis (which Hampton identifies as of
Nietzschean pedigree and which appears to be forcefully articulated in Cheshire
10

See, RS Downie, Forgiveness, 15(59)

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY128,

128-134
138 (1975);
Joanna North, Wrongdoing and Forgiveness, 62 PHILOSOPHY 499 (1987); JEFFRIE G.
MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (Cambridge University Press
1988); Norvin Richards, Forgiveness, ETHICS 99 (1988); John Wilson, Why Forgiveness
Requires Repentance, 63 PHILOSOPHY 246, 534 (October 1988); Robert C Roberts,
Forgiveness, 32.4 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 289 (1995); David Novitz,
Forgiveness and Self-Respect, 58.2 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 209
(1998); Pamela Hieronymi, Articulatingan UncompromisingForgiveness, 62.3 PHILOSOPHY
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 529 (2001); TM Scanlon, Chapter 4 - Blame
(pre-publication draft available on file), 2008. In her study of forgiveness in the
work of Hannah Arendt, Julia Kristeva makes sure to emphasize the result of a
distinction that was accurately foreshadowed by Kolnai: "forgivenessis directedtoward the
person, not the act. One cannotforgive murder or theft, only the murdereror the thief In addressing
someone rather than something,forgiveness reveals itself as an act of love" ("le pardons'adresse a
(1965);Anne C Minas, God and Forgiveness, 25

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

la personne, non a l'acte. On ne peut pardonnerle meurtre ou le vol, seulement le meurtrier ou le
voleur. En s'adressanta quelqu'un et non a quelque chose, lepardonse devoile comme acte d'amour
[..]"; Hannah Arendt p. 361; cited from Alison Rice, Forgiveness:An interview with Julia
Kristeva, 117(2) PMLA 278, 280 (Mar., 2002).
"
12

Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred in Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean
Hampton FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 41 (Cambridge, 1988). [hereinafter Hampton].
Hampton, supra note 11, at 36. Kolnai, while not expressly addressing this
issue,
seems to make allowance for situations where forgiveness is not a duty thus: 'Fred'

Jean

forgiving Ralph... however duty-like, is not a strict obkgation like promise-keeping or even certain
acts of benevolence..." Kolnai, supra note 3, at p. 101. Contrast this with the idea of
forgiveness that strictly requires the granting of forgiveness in certain situations,

which finds support in the Jewish religious tradition.
105

Vol. 6

Sodo-LegalReview

2010

Calhoun's insistence that forgiveness is 'elective') remains undisturbed even at
the end of 'Forgiveness, resentment and hatred', 3 Hampton categorically rejects
Murphy's 'definition of forgiveness as the overcoming of resentment' (enriched
by a cognitive understanding) on account of its inability to usefully differentiate
between condonation and forgiveness.

4

Hampton concludes understanding that

the crucial change of heart in the forgiver that constitutes the first stage of
forgiveness involves a 'reapproval' or 'new understanding' where the wrongdoer

is seen as 'still decent, not rotten as a person, and someone with whom he [forgiver] may
stillbe able to renew a relationshij" or as "good enough".'" Forgiveness, for Hampton,
is the decision to see a wrongdoer in a new, more favourable light achieved
through the overcoming of indignation and moral hatred (in addition to
repudiation of malice, spite and similar emotions) along with the transcending
of resentment.'6
Gideon Rosen (relying on Bishop Butler's definitional phrase - 'to forgive is

to forswear resentment; it is not to abandon the judgment that the act is resentment-worthy)
also usefully articulates Kolnai's paradox (while unabashedly acknowledging
that he 'can think of no plausible answer to this question'):

3
14

15
16

See Cheshire Calhoun, Changing Ones Heart,ETmics 103 (1992).
Hampton, like Kolnai, correctly points out that "the central difference between them
is that condonation involves accepting the moral wrong whereas forgiveness does
not." Hampton states: "What seems required to make a change of heart towards a wrongdoer
something other than condonation supplies the foundationfor explaining andjustifying that change
of heartas something otherthanforgiveness." See Hampton, supranote 11, at 42. Hampton's
emphasis on the example of the wife who condones (and not forgives) her father-inlaw's wrongdoing to her on account of the moral end of family peace plays a prominent
role in developing her argument for a new definition of forgiveness. See Hampton,
supra note 11, at 38, 39.
Hampton, supra note 11, at 83, 84.
Hampton's account emphasizing a new understanding or a new relationship is
reminiscent of Arendt's view of the faculty of forgiveness as a possible redemption
from the predicament of irreversibility. Arendt says: "Without being forgiven, released
from the consequences of what we have done, our capadly to act would, as it were, be confined to one
single deed from which we could never recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences
forever, not unlike the sorcerers apprentice who lacked the magicformula to break the spell." See
Arendt, supra note 5, at 237.
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'If resentment consists in the thought that the act was wrong and that
sanctions would constitute an appropriateresponse to it, in what sense can
one forswear resentment while retaining thesejudgments?"
Pamela Hieronymi's account of an 'articulate' and 'uncompromising'
forgiveness addresses Kolnai's paradox in a very instructive manner. In much
the same way as Kolnai establishes the pre-requisite conditions for the very
possibility of a genuine forgiveness, Hieronymi acknowledges that the
abandonment of resentment must be uncompromising towards three
(interrelated) judgments in order to count as genuine forgiveness:
1)

that the act in question was wrong;

2)

that the wrongdoer is someone to be held responsible for her actions and
is worth being upset by, and;

3)

that the injured person ought not to have been wronged and has standing
to complain about the wrongful act."

Hieronymi makes the claim that resentment is grounded not on these three
judgments which must be maintained but on a fourth judgment which, other
things being equal, the three above judgments imply: that the event in question
makes a threatening claim. This fourth judgment can be rationally undermined
by an apology, without requiring the abandonment or revision of the other three.
Since resentment protests a past action that persists as a present threat, in
"accepting an adequate apology, one can believe the threat to be past and so abandon one
protest [and resentment] without abandoning (nor ceasing to care about) one judgment that
the act in question was wrong, that the wrongdoer should be expected not do such things, and
that one ought not be so treated. And so this account articulates how, in response to an
apology; forgiveness can be uncompromising."" It is in specific response to Kolnai's
17

Gideon Rosen,

The Alethic Conception of Cupability, ROUGH

DRAFT FOR THE COLUMBIA

LEGAL THEORY WORKSHOP AND THE YALE SEMINAR ON LAW AND PHILOSOPHY,

January

10, 2006 [available on file with author].
18

See Pamela Hieronymi, Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness, 62.3
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

19

PHILOSOPHY

529 (2001) [hereinafter Hieronymi]

See id., at 552.
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question as to why an acknowledgment of the moral truth of a situation without
any resentment deserves the lofty title of forgiveness that Hieronymi ventures
her vision of forgiveness:

"If al/goes well, thejoint action of requesting andgrantingforgiveness
will leave the original meaning of the event in the past. This is the
first thing forgiveness "does........ [w]ith forgiveness, the offended
agrees to bear in her own person the cost of the wrongdoing and to
incorporate the injur into her own life without further protest and
without demandfor retribution...... I am instead askingyou to believe
me when I say that I no longer see what I did toyou as acceptable, to
recogniZe and so ratify my change of heart. I am also, importantly,
askingyou to willingly absorb the damage that I have done and which
I cannot repair, both the damage in our relationshep and the broader
material or financial damage, which is an offense to you and which
testifies against my change of head." 20
Such an account, which traces its ancestry to both Levinas and Arendt,
fails to completely resolve Kolnai's paradox for several reasons. 2 1 Most
fundamentally, it fails because of the implausibility of forgiveness ever definitively
leaving the original meaning of the event in the past. The internal memories of
the forgiver and the forgiven, and the external recording by the archive, keep
the event and the uncompromising forgiveness in the present and in the past.
While a complete discussion of this theme requires a larger discussion on memory
and emotions, Hieronymi's account confuses the fundamental distinction between
forgiveness and forgetting, since it ignores the possibility of forgiveness being
granted but subsequently being withdrawn, or of resurfacing or regenerating
20
21

Hieronymi, supra note 18, at 530, 531, 554.
Emmanuel Levinas makes the claim that "[forgiveness acts upon the past, somehow repeats
the event,purifying it," a notion similar to Hannah Arendt's view that forgiveness alters
the ethical significance of a wrongdoer's past by keeping it from having a permanent
or fixed character. See Lisa Guenther, The Gift of the Other: Levinas and the Politics of
Reproduction, New York 2006, cited from, Paul M. Hughes, "Forgiveness", in Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at (last visited on 08 June 2010) <http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/forgiveness/>.
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resentment arising from memory and cognition of the victim.22 The second feature
of forgiveness offered by Hieronymi is unconvincing for a different reason.
Hieronymi's account suggests that what forgiveness does is to enable the forgiver
to 'willingly absorb the damage done'. However, a willing absorption of the
damage does not need forgiveness, since there is no longer any wrongdoing to
truly forgive. What one is willing to absorb cannot be accurately called wrongful
damage that requires an apology and can be considered for forgiveness. A truly
uncompromising forgiveness would require that the forgiver always unwillingly
absorb the damage. Hieronymi's account admittedly suffers from further
limitations. It cannot explain forgiveness in paradigm cases where: 1) no apology
is offered; or 2) no present threat to protest may be clearly identifiable; or 3)
other emotions such as disappointment, frustration, sadness, etc are involved
while resentment is not involved; or 4) one forgives themselves.2 3
As is clear from the foregoing analysis, Kolnai's paradox revolves around
one central issue - the logical difficulties in conceptualizing a scenario where
one [the analytic category of forgiver] can forgive the wrongdoer (and thereby
forswear emotions such as resentment, hatred, indignation, disappointment,
frustration and the like) while at the same time not condoning (but, in fact,
condemning) the wrong committed. Like Hieronymi's approach, Saint
Augustine's famous dictum of 'Hate the sin, love the sinner seems to, at first glance,
provide a straightforward and satisfactory solution to the paradox. However
Kolnai himself has pointed out the weakness of such solutions:
"Hate the sin" unambiguouslyprecludes outright gnical condonation;yet
"love the sinner" encouraging unconditionaland as it were instantaneous

forgiveness, introduces an

element of ambguity. It

postulates a neat

separabilitybetween the sin andthe sinner,which isfictitious,and insinuates
a wholly misleading analogy between wrongdoing and illness..'24

22

23
24

On the relevance of memory, history and forgetting, see PAUL RICOEUR, LA MEMOIRE,
L'ISTOIRE, LbuBi (Paris, Seuil, 2000).
Hieronymi, supra note 18, at 552-553.
Kolnai, supra note 3, at 97.
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Kolnai's overall unhappiness with the paradoxical concept of forgiveness
and its role in moral and interpersonal life is all too evident. At one stage, he
even goes so far as to formulate 'a selfsuffzcient maxim of interpersonalconduct that
seems to have no place for, and no need for, forgiveness:
"Respond to value wholeheartedy, condemn and shun disvalue; be
gratefulfor kindness done toyou and recafrocate it, retaliate (within the
appropriate limits, without oversteppingyour rights and lapsing into
vindictiveness, without disproportionate hostility) for malicious wrong
suffered."25
It is possible that Kolnai felt that (a non paradoxical) forgiveness was
an impossibility. We shall never know this with any degree of certainty.
Here, however, it is useful to highlight two methodological choices invoked
by Kolnai in his delimitation of the concept of forgiveness (the section of
the paper immediately preceding his articulation of the logical paradox of
forgiveness):
1)

The analysis of forgiveness is restricted to a context of "interpersonal"
relations - that is, relations between two parties "on a footing of equality",
with neither of them being the other's "superior" or having "authority"
over the other.26

2)

This interpersonal context of forgiveness is explicitly distinguished from
the purely religious context(s) of forgiveness. 27

25
26

27

Kolnai, supra note 3, at 98.
Kolnai, supra note 3, at 91, 92.
"[t he literal translation of German vergeben (noun, Vergebung) would be 'forgive" and

'forgiveness" but in actual usage it means "remission" which can be grantedonly by God and
has its place exclusively in a religious context." Kolnai, supra note 3, at 94. Kolnai also
adds: "[t]he form of reconciliation, called in English "4tonement" is again a purely religious
category: it means a restoration of (sinful) man ' "being at one" with God, and presupposes
"tenitence" or 'enance" ("atoningfor'), which belongs to relfgious language alone." Kolnai,
supra note 3, at 94.
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We now turn our attention to the conceptual nature of divine forgiveness
to ascertain whether such forgiveness is not vulnerable to Kolnai's paradox.28

Divine Forgiveness, Kantian Grace and Kolnai's Paradox
Forgiveness features prominently in major religious traditions (including
Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism). The concept of
forgiveness also features prominently in many non-religious and interpersonal
contexts. India's apology for the iniquities of the caste system, Australia's
apology to the stolen generations of aborigines, Japan's repentance for wartime
atrocities, America's shame over its detention of people of Japanese descent
and its apology to Native American populations, South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, the German apology to victims of the Holocaust,
and public repentance by our political leaders, religious heads, and celebrities
for their sexual infidelities, financial dishonesty, or other peccadilloes all represent
examples in an increased trend where individuals, companies, armies, head of
state, nations seek to be forgiven. The broad Abrahamic tradition (bringing
together Christianity, Judaism, and Islam) that infuses the global grammar and
idiom of law, politics, morality, economy and diplomacy plays and re-plays (in
non-religious contexts) scenes of repentance, confession, apology and forgiveness
drawn primarily from a religious stable. Arendt points out that '[the discoverer of

the role of forgiveness in the realm of human affairs was Jesus of Nazareth.'2 9 Derrida
points out that "the globalisation' of forgiveness resembles an immense scene of confession
in progress, thus a virtualy Christian convulsion-conversion-confession, a process of
Christianisation which has no more need for the Christian church."' It is undisputed
that the language, idiom, scene and cognition of forgiveness have evolved from
28

Alexander Pope's An Essay on Criticism (1711) elegantly depicts the merit in a special
attention to divine forgiveness. Pope states:
"Ah ne'er so dire a Thirst of Glory boast,
Nor in the Critick let the Man be lost!
Good-Nature and Good-Sense must ever join;
To err is human, to forgive divine"

See
29
30

ALEXANDER POPE, An Essay on Criticism, available at (last visited on 08 June,
2010) <http://poetry.eserver.org/essay-on-criticism.html>.
ARENDT, supra note 5, at 238.
DERRIDA, supra note 6, at 31.
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religious heritages across the world.3' It is in this context that a closer appraisal
of interpersonal forgiveness as similar to (and different from) divine forgiveness
is helpful, since it instructs us about the panoply of values, attitudes and reasons
that could justify a truly logical forgiveness that resolves Kolnai's paradox.32
While a descriptive account of divine forgiveness in the different religious
traditions lies outside the scope of this paper, a useful conceptual bridge is
provided for us by Immanuel Kant's articulation of the concept of grace.3 3 We
first note some of the salient features of Kant's moral philosophy that relate to
our focus on forgiveness. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to identify
the existence of a limited duty to be forgiving in some situations. He however
goes on to limit this duty in a manner that clearly foreshadows Kolnai's critical
distinction between forgiveness and condonation. Warning us that too much
forgiving manifests a lack of adequate respect for one self, Kant states: "But this
[the duty of forgiveness] must not be confused with meek toleration of wrongs.. .forthen a
human being would be throwing away his rghts and letting others trample on them, and so
would violate his duty to himself" 34 This recalls Aristotle's idea that the person
deficient in appropriate anger is "unlikely to defend himself" and "endure being
insulted" and is for this reason a "fool" (NicomacheanEthics, 1126a5), and Hume's
assertion that since anger and hatred are "inherent in our very frame and
constitution" the lack of such feelings is sometimes evidence of "weakness
and imbecility" (Hume, 1958, p. 6 0 5 )."
31

32

34

35

The Bhagavad-Gita (one of the key holy texts of Hinduism) explicitly identifies
forgiveness as a transcendental quality that belongs 'to godly men endowed with divine
nature.' See Chapter 16, Text 3, BHAGAVAD-GITA.
For a contrary approach that argues that God is not capable of forgiveness, see
Anne C Minas, God and Forgiveness, 25 PHILosOPHICALQUARTERLY (1975).
Derrida, analyzing the right to grace and its relation to law, states: "For the right of grace
is, as its name suggests, of the order of law, but a law which inscribes in the laws a power above the
laws.... The absolute monarch can, by divine ight,pardon a criminal; that is to say, exercise in the
name of the State aforgiveness that transcendsand neutralisesthe law. Right [droit] beyond the law
[dmit]." 'Carle drit de grdce est bien, comme son nom l'indique, de l'ordre du doit mais d'un dmit
qui inscrit dans ks lois un pouvoir au-dessus des lois.' See DERRIDA, supra note 6, at 45, 50.
See METAPHYsICS OF MoRALs, CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE W1ORKs OF IMANUEL KANT
in TRANSLATION AA 06: 461 (Cambridge, 1996).
Paul M. Hughes, supra note 1.
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The incompatibility between forgiveness and the Kantian idea of freedom
leads John R. Silber to conclude that Kant's view of freedom 'shatters on the
problem of forgiveness'.36 Silber, of course, acknowledges that 'Kant could clearly see
the incompatibility of forgiveness and absolute freedom... was sorely troubled on this
point... [and that]... [it is a tribute to Kant' reasonableness and humanity that he
contradicted his theorj by admitting the possibility of grace."" The incompatibility
between the idea of forgiveness and the conception of absolute freedom in
Kant's writings arises because the purity (or strictness) of the law and the
absolute nature of freedom effectively preclude the need for (or granting of)
forgiveness by another. Kant points out in his opening lines in the preface to
Relgion within the Limits of Reason Alone:
"So far as morality is based upon the conception of man as afree agent who,
just because he is free, binds himself through his reason to unconditioned
laws, it stands in need neither of the idea of another Being over him, for
him to apprehendhis duty, nor of an incentive other than the law itself for
him to do his duy......for whatever does not originate in himself and his
own freedom in no way compensatesfor the deficieng of his morality."38
Despite Kant's insistence that we can only become good or evil by our
own efforts, Kant remains unwilling to discard the idea of grace altogether. For
Kant, the notion of grace of God helps resolve the paradox that our moral
transformation must already be completed before we can even coherently
attempt moral improvement." Therefore, in Religion within the Boundaries ofMere
36

See John R Silber, The Ethical Signficance of Kant's Relgion, in the
IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE

INTRODUCTION TO

cxxxi (Theodore

M. Greene and Hoyt. M Hudson eds., 1960) [hereinafter Silber].
3

38

39

See Id. Silber, at cxxxii, cxxxiii.
"Preface to the First Edition", in Immanuel Kant, Relgion within the Limits of Reason
Alone 3 (Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt. M Hudson eds, 1960) [hereinafterReligion].
Kant states: "[W~hat in our earthly lfe (andperhaps even in allfuture times and in all worlds)
is always only a mere becoming (namely, our being a human being well-pleasing to God) is imputed
to us as if we already possessed it here in full." See IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE
BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON, AND OTHER WRITINGS, CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE
WORKS OF

IMMANUEL

KANT IN TRANSLATION AA

06: 75 (Cambridge, 1998) [hereinafter

Religion]. Also see, David Sussman, Kantian Forgiveness,96 KANT-STUDIEN 85, 92-3, 99
(2005). (hereinafter Sussman).
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Reason, Kant does assign a crucial role to our belief that divine grace will supplement
the inevitable moral shortfall which results from the infirmities of our being:
"To believe that grace may have its effects, and thatperhaps there must be
such effects to supplement the imperfection of our striving for virtue, is all
that we can say on the subject."40
Significantly, Kant is confident in representing God's decision to bestow
grace as 'elective' or 'arbitrary' - as God, by hypothesis, would never be capable
of wrongly apportioning grace one way rather than the other.4' Sussman points
out that the divine 'apportionment ofgrace is properly represented /by Kant] as being
inscrutable, not because he has no reasons to distribute it in one way rather than another,
but because he has too many.'42
These broad contours of the Kantian notion of grace noted, we return to
the question of why divine forgiveness is not vulnerable to Kolnai's paradox.
The French expression "tout comprendre, c'est tout pardoner" (to understand
everything is to forgive everything) holds contained within it a part of the answer
perhaps. Divine forgiveness accommodates (at the noumenal level) the idea of
an existence with a unitary conception of information and time - that is, eternal
knowledge and eternal time - as contrasted with the uncertain, largely
indeterminate, episodic, and temporal nature of our own existence. Kant points
out that a crucial part of receiving grace involves having our present state judged
(by God) in terms of the totality of our character.4 3 The notions of grace and
divine forgiveness therefore are premised on an intuitive divine intellect that
stands outside of time and is capable of grasping our true whole character
immediately (and the constituent parts through the whole). Kant states:
"According to our mode of estimation, who are unavoidably restricted to
temporal conditions in our conceptions of the relationship of cause to

40
41

42
43

Religion, supra note 38, at AA 06: 120.
For a detailed discussion, see the section entitled "The Mystery of Election" in Religion,
supra note 38, at AA 06: 143-144.
Sussman, supra note 39, at 103.
As Kant says: "fTlbe moral subjectiveprindtle of the disposition by which our life is to bejudged
is (as transcending our senses) not of the kind that its existence can be thought as divisible into
temporal segments but rather only as an absolute uniy." See Rekgion, at AA 06: 70n.
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effect, the deed, as a continuous advance in infinitumfrom a defective good
to something better, always remains defective, so that we are bound to
consider the good as it appears in us, i.e. according to the deed, as at each
instant inadequate to a holy law. But because of the dispositionfrom
which it derives and which transcends the senses, we can think of the
infinite progression of the good toward conformity to the law as being
judged by him who scrutiniZes the heart (through his pure intellectual
intuition) to be aperfectedwhole with respectto the deed (the life conduct)." 44
Divine forgiveness and grace, therefore, admit of a (divine) forgiver who
stands outside of time and is capable of grasping the entirety of time (past,
present and future) intuitively and is also cognizant of all possible information
regarding the wrongdoer, the wrongful act, and the relationship between the
wrongdoer and the injured person. If we follow Kant, this divine forgiver while deciding whether to accord grace - judges the wrongdoer (even at the
time of, or immediately subsequent to, the deed of wrongdoing) with awareness
of the future 'perfected whole' of the wrongdoer. To emphasize this point, God
(the divine forgiver) intuitively grasps the 'perfected whole' of the wrongdoer
and (by virtue of being outside of time) is cognizant of the future path of the
wrongdoer. Therefore, for God qua forgiver, it is possible to 'absolve someone from
guilt and still remain committed to the idea that his [immediate] actions were wrong and
unacceptable.' It is these informational and temporal premises that render Kolnai's
45
paradox inapplicable to divine forgiveness.

44

Religion, supra note 38, at AA 06: 67.

45

A potential human forgiver however does not have the (divine) vantage position of
being outside of time nor does she have access to a totality of information regarding
the wrongdoer, the wrongful act, and her continuing relationship with the wrongdoer.
The injured person (or potential forgiver) therefore does not have an intuitive grasp
of the 'perfected whole' of the offender and is not cognizant of the future trajectory
of the offender's moral life. At the time of deciding on whether to forgive the
wrongdoer, the injured person remains restricted to the empirically available
information pertaining to the wrongful deed in question and the wrongdoer, to her
subjective knowledge of the nature of her past relationship with the wrongdoer, and
finally, to her estimations of her future relationship with the wrongdoer (if any). In this
situation of relative uncertainty (particularly, whether the wrongdoer will behave in a
similar fashion again), a human forgiver cannot fuly absolve the wrongdoer of guilt
(with the comfort of knowing that such absolution was indeed warranted in light of
future developments) or condemn the wrongful act.
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By contrast, the relative temporal and informational indeterminacy of interpersonal scenarios (where forgiveness is in question) leads to limitations on the
wronged person's ability to both absolve the wrongdoer of guilt and to remain
committed to the idea that the actions were wrong and unacceptable. In effect,
the injured person finds herself in a position where she cannot grant a logically
consistent forgiveness but must search for other responses.46 This is exactly
what Kolnai prophesized (and perhaps argued for) when he formulated his selfsufficient maxim for interpersonal conduct without resorting to the paradoxical
notion of (inter-personal) forgiveness.
Salvaging the concept of forgiveness from complete logical havoc requires
us to answer the question of how forgivers [in interpersonal contexts] can best
approximate the informational and temporal premises that God qua divine
forgiver enjoys. Such an approach is perfectly in consonance with the Kantian
framework, which advocates the imitation of Christ (who represents the
apotheosis of a 'humanity well-pleasing to God') as one of our fundamental
duties. Speaking on very general terms, most religions support the human
aspiration to imitate/approximate traits of divine beings and deities to the
maximum extent possible. In order to realize forgiveness in our individual lives,
in our law, and in our society, it is pertinent to ask which values, virtues or
attitudes aid our moral transformation so as to provide a divine vantage position
when deciding to forgive. In the final part of his paper, Kolnai attempts to
'salvage the concept of forgiveness from logical havoc' by directing us towards
three inter-related enquiries that suggest the resolution of his paradox. First,
Kolnai suggests a 'careful differential approach' involving degrees and variants
in analyzing notions of wronging, wrongdoing, the wrongdoer, etc. Kolnai states
that 'genuine forgiveness ... does not necessarily presuppose a dramatic and
fundamental change of heart evinced by the wrongdoer.'4 7 Second, Kolnai
46

The Holy Quran states, in Surah ash Shura 42.40: "The recompense for an injury is an
injury equal thereto (in degree): but if apersonforgives and makes recondliation, his reward is due
from Allah for Allah loves not those who do wrong."
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Kolnai, supra note 3, at 100. This is at variance with the approaches adopted by
Pamela Hieronymi and TM Scanlon who agree that forgiveness is only warranted
when the wrongdoer acknowledges the wrongness of the act(s) in question and takes
requisite steps to reestablish a relationship with the injured party. See Hieronymi,
supra note 10; TM Scanlon, supra note 10.
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emphasizes the fact of the permanence of guilt of the offender qua the wrong,
a permanence that is not altered by forgiveness.48 Lastly, addressing the
connection between forgiveness and the 'generous venture of trust', Kolnai
emphasizes trust 'as the culmination and epitome of morality.' It is to this third
aspect that I briefly turn my attention in the concluding remarks.

Trust, Patience and Forgiveness
In the concluding section of his paper, Kolnai idealizes forgiveness that
springs from, and reveals, virtue as a very high virtue indeed. This virtue of
logical forgiveness stands out in sharp contrast to a retributive attitude, to an
indifference to Value and Disvalue, and to condonation and a lack of selfrespect. Forgiveness, according to Kolnai, expresses the "attitude of trust in the
world which, unless it is vitiated by hare-brainedoptimism and dangerous irresponsibiliy,
may be looked upon, not to be sure as the starting-pointand the verj basis, butperhaps as the
epitome and culmination of morality."49 He adds: "It [attitude of trust] is closely tied up
with the demotion of our concern about Certitudeand Safety infavour of a boldly, venturesomely
apiringand activepursuit of Value - infinitely remote from a craven acceptance of Disvalue
andfrom plaing of practicalsuccess, comfort, '"djustment" etc. above Right, moralsensitiviy,
purity and sense of d nit. Ofering trust 'in advance" may increase the objective trustworthiness
of the recipient'o Clearly, trust is the only attitude that permits a rational account
of forgiveness even in situations where it is unclear whether the offender has
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Kolnai's example of Ralph who wrongs Fred and seeks forgiveness is particularly
incisive. He says: "The Ralph who has undergone this metanoia is in one sense no longer
identical with Ralph the offender qua offender, but in another sense he is still identical with the
Ralph who committed the offence, for he is still Ralph, i.e., the same person; in English verbal
idiom, he is the Ralph who has committed the offence. Hence there is still 'something to be
forgiven" and an act of forgiveness on the wronged person -Fred -partis required in order to
eliminate the offence from the texture of their relationshi and in that sense to "annul"it (while it
cannot be undone in the sense of effecting its not having been committed). The present Ralph is not
discontinuous with the Ralph who once "wronged" Fred; our revoking, disavowing, regretting,
condemning, repenting, etc. a past act of ours cannot, however deisivey it may change our moral
status, wish away our responsibilityfor that act." Kolnai, supra note 3, at 101.
Kolnai, supra note 3, at 105.
See id.
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undergone a genuine change of heart regarding the offence (for example, where
there is no apology and no sign of remorse and repentance).
Trust allows the injured person to recognize the potential future value of
the wrongdoer and of a continuing relationship with her. Trust also allows the
injured person to more fully recognize that the wrongdoer is just another person
'like her' - deserving of the same respect and capable of the same moral
rightness. Trust promotes the feeling in the injured person's mind that when she
is being judged for her wrongdoing(s), she too will benefit from someone else
(the forgiver) placing trust in her. Finally, trust also reduces the informational
and temporal indeterminacy that the injured person faces (when contemplating
forgiveness) by promoting several presumptions: that the offender has learned
the mistake of her ways, that such wrongful deeds are not likely to be repeated
in the future, that the wrongful act may be confidently judged on the basis of
available information without worry about additional negative facts surfacing,
and so on.
Kolnai's parting words on the imperative value that enables trust find
mention in his passing consideration of self-forgiveness. Kolnai states:
"Yet we can have, or lack, patience with oursef seeing that it is for our
own life that we are most integrally responsible and that our total and
definitive breach with ourself implies our absolute rupture with, and
mistrust of the world."'
Patience allows for, and nurtures, the attitude of trust that enables a logical
and virtuous forgiveness. For example, patience allows the injured person to
obtain more information about the wrongdoer, the wrong deed, and about the
51

Kolnai, supra note 3, at 106. Kolnai's celebrated paper ends with some verses of the
mediaeval "Monk of Heisterbach" quoted in Franz Brentano's Vom Ursprung sittlicher

Erkenntnis:
Sonne dich an Gottes grosmser Huld;
Hab' mit Allen - auch mit dir - Geduld.
(Bask in the sunshine of God's great bounty; have patience with all - including
thyself.)

118

Imperative Values of a LogicalForgiveness

(past, present and future) relationship between herself and the wrongdoer before
deciding on whether forgiveness is to be granted. Patience allows the wrongdoer
to endure the uncertainty of being forgiven or not. It prevents the wrongdoer
from losing conviction in the Value of their redemption and remorse. Importantly,
patience also helps confirm the accuracy of the characterization that the act in
question was indeed wrong and that it has been correctly attributed to the
wrongdoer. Patience also promotes the possibility of forgiveness on the
understanding that the passage of additional time might result in the injured
person feeling differently about the wrongful act and its significance.
Patience and Trust represent the imperative values for a logical inter-personal
forgiveness. These values enable the best approximation of the informational
and temporal attributes of divine forgiveness. Any judgment involving forgiveness
and its related forms in juridico-political, judicial, and moral discussion would
do well in considering how patience and trust can best be promoted through
our ordering of norms, law and society.
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